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1 Introduction: Aim of the Review 
The aim of this literature review is to understand the effectiveness of regional peacekeeping2 and the associated 
challenges with it by identifying and critically assessing trends and findings in the recent scholarly literature. 
More specifically, the review focuses on the advantages and disadvantages of peacekeeping by regional 
organizations (ROs), cooperative peacekeeping between ROs and the United Nations (UN), and regional 
peacekeeping in relation to the authorization of the use of force by the UN Security Council (UNSC). In doing 
so, this review essay enables us to grasp whether regional organizations can be the breakthrough when the UN 
is reluctant to get involved in a conflict in which there is no peace to keep. 
Effectiveness here includes the following elements: 1) legitimacy, 2) the accomplishment of mandated 
tasks and the contribution to both 3) short-term peace, for instance a cessation of hostilities and 4) long-term 
durable peace3. In terms of legitimacy, peacekeeping is unlikely to be acceptable if the parties to a conflict do 
not consent to the intervention. Consequently, operations not based on consent result in failure. Whether or not 
the mandates are accomplished is transparent measurement of successful peacekeeping. Moreover, preventing 
the recurrence of conflict and resolving the disagreement among the conflicting actors, as well as the local 
people affected by the conflict, are essential for long-term peace. These aspects are examined in the fourth 
section. 
ROs have begun to play a crucial role in peacekeeping endevors since the early 1990s, as with the African 
Union (AU) in Burundi, Darfur and Somalia, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in 
Liberia and Sierra Leone, and the European Union (EU) in Bosnia, Macedonia and Kosovo, to name a few. In 
the meantime, having remained the dominant peacekeeping actor, the UN has reducing its peacekeeping role 
due to the traumatic experiences in Somalia, Rwanda and Bosnia in 1990s. In addition, the Chapter VIII of the 
UN Charter prescribes the role of ROs in maintaining international peace and security, encouraging ‘the 
development of the pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements’. More recently, the 
cooperation between the UN and ROs has been strengthened and a different type of peacekeeping has emerged, 
as so-called ‘hybrid peacekeeping’. The AU-UN mission in Darfur is a case in point. Against this background, 
the RO as an emerging custodian of peace has some challenges to deal with in light of the primacy of the UNSC, 
as well as efficacy problems. Thus, summarizing and critically assessing the current literature on regional 
peacekeeping operations is of high importance for both scholars and practitioners so as to identify ROs’ 
strengths and weaknesses for more effective and efficient operations in the future.  
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2 Selection Criteria and Structure of the Essay 
This essay reviews 15 peer-reviewed articles published between 2006 and 2014. These articles discuss 1) the 
advantages and disadvantages of peacekeeping by ROs, 2) the cooperative peacekeeping between the UN and 
ROs and 3) the primacy of the UNSC concerning the UN Charter. The rationale for including not only the 
articles on the effectiveness of regional peacekeeping but also the literature discussing the relationship between 
the UN and ROs is that analyzing the UN is inextricable given its major role in peacekeeping since its 
establishment and the recent trend of the collaborative peacekeeping between the two actors. In other words, the 
efficacy of regional peacekeeping is highly dependent on the UN. Lastly, this selection of articles clarifies a 
distinction from adjacent areas of research, such as independent UN peacekeeping, state-led peacekeeping, 
for example, French-led peace operations in Africa, intervention by ‘the coalition of the willing’ such as the 
Australian-led peace mission in the Solomon Islands, and peacekeeping by ROs from outside the given  
continent including EU missions in Africa. The reason for the exclusion of these other research areas is because 
the wider scope makes the argument elusive. As a further caveat, this paper does not explore conflict 
management comprised of conflict prevention, conflict mitigation and resolution of conflict by various actors 
including the UN, ROs, or states and mediation or post-conflict peacebuilding by ROs.  
The next section overviews the articles along with the three types of the literature as mentioned above. 
More specifically, the first part identifies causal arguments about how regional peacekeeping is instrumental. 
The next part looks at the cooperative relationship between the UN and ROs in peace operations. The last 
examines the debate over the primacy of the UNSC considering the UN Charter. The fourth part continues with 
a critical evaluation of the arguments and findings of the literature from the spectrum of theoretical perspectives, 
empirical foci and methodology in order to highlight the research gap that needs to be scrutinized. The final 
section summarizes the findings and presents prospects for future research. This paper emphasizes that regional 
peacekeeping still has some challenges to address. Despite the expectation by a majority of scholars that the 
collaborative peacekeeping is a desirable form for future operations, it does not seem to be a panacea for 
maintaining regional and international peace and security. There are several problems and gaps to demonstrate 
this optimistic assumption. The gaps that this essay identifies are a dilemma between legitimacy and other 
aspects of effectiveness, the possibility of hybrid peacekeeping prevailing on the primacy problem of the UNSC, 
the narrow empirical foci, a comparative case study with coherent criteria of effectiveness, and a need of a 
large-N study.  
3 Advantages and Disadvantages of Regional Peacekeeping 
The first part of the third section identifies the advantages and disadvantages of regional peacekeeping. 
Distinguishing regional peacekeeping through advantages and disadvantages is a relatively common way of 
analyzing it among literature (Angelov 2010: Bures 2006: Tardy 2014). This dichotomous distinction allows us 
to clarify not only strengthens of peacekeeping but also its weaknesses, helping researchers and practitioners to 
maximize the former aspects and minimize the latter. This paper uses the same distinction. 
Commonalities, proximity, conflict resolution and legitimacy are the key advantages, whilst the financial 
resources, institutional capacity, an institutionalized bureaucracy, impartiality, regional hegemons, advancing 
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regionalization, and uneven geographical presence as well as institutional differences can be categorized as 
disadvantages. 
3－1 Advantages 
Commonalities. Shared or similar culture, tradition, ethnic roots, religion, language, and historical ties can 
provide the more favorable decision-making process compared to those of the UN (Angelov 2010: Bures 2006). 
Because of these commonalities, the membership of a RO tends to be homogenous in relation to international 
organizations, giving the former an advantage over the latter. Bures (2006) argues that the shared 
commonalities among the member states of a RO make it easier for them to reach consensus, authorize 
peacekeeping and make a decision in a timely manner. Moreover, Angelov (2010) emphasizes that having a 
better knowledge and understanding of local actors like NGOs, ROs can efficiently get them involved in 
peace-making efforts. He adds that a lack of understanding of local culture by the international community 
hinders successful peacekeeping, stating ‘there is indeed nobody who knows a particular region better than the 
countries that belong to it. Such familiarity may provide leverage vis-a`-vis the belligerent factions, which is 
often unavailable to distant international actors who are unfamiliar with the situation’(Angelov 2010, 607). 
 
Proximity. Proximity promotes efficient peace operations. First, since the members of a RO are in general 
anxious about the escalation of tension or conflict in neighboring counties, they are more likely to endeavor to 
gather necessary information and offer early warning. Furthermore, they can deploy peacekeeping more rapidly 
than the international community because of their geographical proximity (Bures 2006: Angelov 2010).   
 
Conflict Resolution. In conjunction with commonalities and proximity, it is argued that member states of a RO 
are more interested in conflict resolution than the international community. Particularly, neighboring counties 
are likely to suffer from the spill-over effect due to economic interdependence, political ties and the flow of the 
displaced. Bures (2006, 92) argues that the UN decision-making does not necessarily reflect all local and 
regional actors’ voices and interests. Also, insufficient understanding of local affairs prevents the UN peace 
operations from dealing with the root causes of conflict, which is essential for durable peace. In contrast, ROs 
are more likely to attempt to resolve conflict in the long-term, tackling with emerging spoilers or splinter groups 
and preventing the recurrence of conflict for durable peace. 
 
Legitimacy. The conflicting parties may prefer regional involvement to the UN intervention because of the 
previously mentioned factors such as familiarity, historical ties or political ties. Regional sensitivity, interests 
and the sense of ownership are likely to give regional peacekeeping the legetimacy to cope with conflict, 
resulting in more efficient operations in tandem with the local conflicting parties (Bures 2006). Occasionally, it 
is difficult to get the UN peacekeeping accepted by all the relevant conflicting parties (Angelov 2010, 609). On 
the other hand, a preference by the parties to a conflict for the acceptance of regional involvement entrenches 
the legitimacy of regional peacekeeping. The AU mission in Sudan is a case in point. Omar al-Bashir preferred 
the AU peacekeeping to the UN’s engagement. His refusal to accept the autonomous UN peacekeeping reduced 
the legitimacy of international involvement, but increased that of the AU.  
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are more likely to attempt to resolve conflict in the long-term, tackling with emerging spoilers or splinter groups 
and preventing the recurrence of conflict for durable peace. 
 
Legitimacy. The conflicting parties may prefer regional involvement to the UN intervention because of the 
previously mentioned factors such as familiarity, historical ties or political ties. Regional sensitivity, interests 
and the sense of ownership are likely to give regional peacekeeping the legetimacy to cope with conflict, 
resulting in more efficient operations in tandem with the local conflicting parties (Bures 2006). Occasionally, it 
is difficult to get the UN peacekeeping accepted by all the relevant conflicting parties (Angelov 2010, 609). On 
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3－2 Disadvantages 
Financial resources. Poor financial resources are one of the most inherent problems associated with regional 
peacekeeping. Even the UN comprised of 193 member states often has a difficulty in providing adequate 
financial resources to peacekeeping, let alone ROs (Angelov 2010: Arthur 2010: Bures 2006: Mickler 2013: 
Weiss and Welz 2014: Williams 2008, 2009). This disadvantage largely hinders operations. For example, the 
ECOWAS Cease-Fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in Liberia, and the AU operations in Darfur and Somalia 
lacked financial resources and therefore the operations were not effective in terms of halting violence and the 
accomplishment of the mandates (Angelov, 2010: Weiss and Welz 2014). To make matters worse, illegal 
looting, theft or expropriation by the ECOMOG peacekeepers was then reported (Arthur 2010, 16). This implies 
that inadequate financial resources not only make it difficult to carry out the responsible missions, but also have 
a negative influence on the peacekeepers morale. 
 
Institutional capacity. In addition to the financial issue, institutional capacity, such as in logistics, military and 
human resources, is another critical obstacle (Angelov 2010: Arthur 2010: Bures 2006: Mickler 2013: Weiss 
and Welz 2014: Williams 2008, 2009). Bures (2006) argues that institutional incapacity stems from a lack of 
peacekeeping experience by ROs. Whereas the UN has much experience of conducting peacekeeping, and 
setting the appropriate procedures and precedents on how to operate, ROs generally do not have sufficient 
knowledge and skills and consequently cannot accumulate know-how to organize effective operations. For 
instance, the ECOMOG personnel were ill-equipped or unprepared in comparison with the rebel groups in 
Liberia and Sierra Leone (Arthur 2010). The AU mission in Somalia (AMISOM) also suffered from the 
insufficient number of deployable troops in the early years (William 2009). 
 
Institutionalized bureaucracy. While meager institutional capacity impedes successful missions, the 
bureaucratic nature of an institution also complicates efficient responses to peacekeeping demands in a timely 
fashion. Hardt (2009) demonstrated that the EU, despite the fact that it is considered as a model for an elaborate 
RO, responded to peacekeeping demands more slowly than the AU or the Organization of American States 
(OAU). ‘On average, the EU took two months longer to respond to relevant peace operation demands than the 
African Union (AU) did’ (Hardt 2009, 383). By using pathologies of international organizations, Hardt ascribes 
the delay of the EU’s response to institutionalized bureaucracy. Redundant meetings, unnecessary consultations 
and excessive procedural formalities create layers of red tape, normalize digressions and expend legitimacy in a 
slow decision-making process. However, late responses that permit the continuation of violence such as was the 
case in Rwanda can attenuate the acceptability of missions to actors in conflict, resulting in unsustainable 
peacekeeping operations. 
 
Impartiality. Not only can proximity bring about positive aspects, but it may also result in negative outcomes. 
Bures (2006) points out that being aware of the fact that the regional peacekeepers are composed of national 
armies of neighboring countries, the parties to a conflict know that the peacekeepers act upon national or 
regional interests. However, this casts a doubt about the impartiality, as well as success, of the mission. Uganda, 
which was one of the major contributors of the troops to the AU mission in Somalia, had several reasons for its 
deployment, including the purpose to counter Islam radicalism in Somalia that might affect Ugandan territory, 
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an ambition to show the regional leadership to obtain a seat in the UN security council as a non-permanent 
member and recovering the reputation of the Ugandan forces which was degraded by the previous mission in 
the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (Williams 2009, 519). Ugandan behavior and action based on the 
dubious reasons often put peacekeepers’ lives at risk. This case in Africa suggests that partial peacekeeping can 
have negative outcomes and limited effectiveness.  
 
Regional hegemons. A dominant power in a RO is highly controversial in the sense that peacekeeping missions 
can be the subject of a regional power’s national interest. Nevertheless, it is also evident that the missions 
cannot be supported politically, financially or logistically in the absence of the leadership of the dominant 
power. Nigeria in the ECOMOG operation, for instance, is often considered as a regional hegemon in the West 
Africa and was accused of using the operation for its national interests (Angelov 2010). Notwithstanding, it was 
difficult to deploy adequately equipped regional peacekeepers without any support by Nigeria. This inherent 
dilemma of peacekeeping led by a regional hegemon is prevalent in the cases of the South Africa in South 
African Development Community (SADC), Russia in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the 
United States in the North Atlantic Treaty of Organization (NATO) (Bures 2006: Durward 2006).  
 
Advancing Regionalization. Promoting peacekeeping by ROs has diverse risks. For example, it provides an 
excuse for the UN or the international community not to get involved in a certain situation in which 
peacekeeping is necessary (Williams 2008). Consequently, even to maintain international peace and security, 
those at stake only get as the quality of peacekeeping that ROs’ lesser capacity can provide (Bures 2006: 
Williams 2008). Furthermore, regionalization of peacekeeping has a risk of undermining the international norm 
supported by the UN Charter and international law (Arthur 2010, 15: Williams 2008). This aspect is discussed 
specifically in the section 3-3.  
 
Uneven geographical presence and institutional differences. The most apparent disadvantage involving regional 
peacekeeping is the geographical coverage of ROs and also institutional differences among them. Firstly, there 
are some regions that do not have regional arrangements, such as East Asia. Second, even if the regional 
organizations are active in several regions, they sometimes do not have provisions for peacekeeping or conflict 
resolution mechanisms as the AU or the NATO have, such as in the Middle East. Accordingly, East Asia and 
the Middle East, where no capable ROs exist, have been suffering from long-lasting conflicts and cannot make 
any substantial efforts in conflict management or resolution at all (Bures 2006, 97). 
3－3 The Relationship between ROs and the UN 
The UN has performed dominant and significant roles in peace operations since its establishment. Accordingly, 
it is indispensable to discussing regional peacekeeping in light of the UN. This section specifically reviews the 
cooperation between the UN and ROs, as well as the discussion over the primacy of the UNSC in regard to the 
authorization of the use of force under the UN Charter.  
 
Cooperative peacekeeping. The cooperation between the UN and ROs in peacekeeping operations is becoming 
a recent trend. Scholars by and large advocate that cooperative peacekeeping, both institutional and 
─ 55 ─
国際地域研究論集（JISRD）第 8号（№ 8）2017
55
 
4 
 
3－2 Disadvantages 
Financial resources. Poor financial resources are one of the most inherent problems associated with regional 
peacekeeping. Even the UN comprised of 193 member states often has a difficulty in providing adequate 
financial resources to peacekeeping, let alone ROs (Angelov 2010: Arthur 2010: Bures 2006: Mickler 2013: 
Weiss and Welz 2014: Williams 2008, 2009). This disadvantage largely hinders operations. For example, the 
ECOWAS Cease-Fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in Liberia, and the AU operations in Darfur and Somalia 
lacked financial resources and therefore the operations were not effective in terms of halting violence and the 
accomplishment of the mandates (Angelov, 2010: Weiss and Welz 2014). To make matters worse, illegal 
looting, theft or expropriation by the ECOMOG peacekeepers was then reported (Arthur 2010, 16). This implies 
that inadequate financial resources not only make it difficult to carry out the responsible missions, but also have 
a negative influence on the peacekeepers morale. 
 
Institutional capacity. In addition to the financial issue, institutional capacity, such as in logistics, military and 
human resources, is another critical obstacle (Angelov 2010: Arthur 2010: Bures 2006: Mickler 2013: Weiss 
and Welz 2014: Williams 2008, 2009). Bures (2006) argues that institutional incapacity stems from a lack of 
peacekeeping experience by ROs. Whereas the UN has much experience of conducting peacekeeping, and 
setting the appropriate procedures and precedents on how to operate, ROs generally do not have sufficient 
knowledge and skills and consequently cannot accumulate know-how to organize effective operations. For 
instance, the ECOMOG personnel were ill-equipped or unprepared in comparison with the rebel groups in 
Liberia and Sierra Leone (Arthur 2010). The AU mission in Somalia (AMISOM) also suffered from the 
insufficient number of deployable troops in the early years (William 2009). 
 
Institutionalized bureaucracy. While meager institutional capacity impedes successful missions, the 
bureaucratic nature of an institution also complicates efficient responses to peacekeeping demands in a timely 
fashion. Hardt (2009) demonstrated that the EU, despite the fact that it is considered as a model for an elaborate 
RO, responded to peacekeeping demands more slowly than the AU or the Organization of American States 
(OAU). ‘On average, the EU took two months longer to respond to relevant peace operation demands than the 
African Union (AU) did’ (Hardt 2009, 383). By using pathologies of international organizations, Hardt ascribes 
the delay of the EU’s response to institutionalized bureaucracy. Redundant meetings, unnecessary consultations 
and excessive procedural formalities create layers of red tape, normalize digressions and expend legitimacy in a 
slow decision-making process. However, late responses that permit the continuation of violence such as was the 
case in Rwanda can attenuate the acceptability of missions to actors in conflict, resulting in unsustainable 
peacekeeping operations. 
 
Impartiality. Not only can proximity bring about positive aspects, but it may also result in negative outcomes. 
Bures (2006) points out that being aware of the fact that the regional peacekeepers are composed of national 
armies of neighboring countries, the parties to a conflict know that the peacekeepers act upon national or 
regional interests. However, this casts a doubt about the impartiality, as well as success, of the mission. Uganda, 
which was one of the major contributors of the troops to the AU mission in Somalia, had several reasons for its 
deployment, including the purpose to counter Islam radicalism in Somalia that might affect Ugandan territory, 
 
5 
 
an ambition to show the regional leadership to obtain a seat in the UN security council as a non-permanent 
member and recovering the reputation of the Ugandan forces which was degraded by the previous mission in 
the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (Williams 2009, 519). Ugandan behavior and action based on the 
dubious reasons often put peacekeepers’ lives at risk. This case in Africa suggests that partial peacekeeping can 
have negative outcomes and limited effectiveness.  
 
Regional hegemons. A dominant power in a RO is highly controversial in the sense that peacekeeping missions 
can be the subject of a regional power’s national interest. Nevertheless, it is also evident that the missions 
cannot be supported politically, financially or logistically in the absence of the leadership of the dominant 
power. Nigeria in the ECOMOG operation, for instance, is often considered as a regional hegemon in the West 
Africa and was accused of using the operation for its national interests (Angelov 2010). Notwithstanding, it was 
difficult to deploy adequately equipped regional peacekeepers without any support by Nigeria. This inherent 
dilemma of peacekeeping led by a regional hegemon is prevalent in the cases of the South Africa in South 
African Development Community (SADC), Russia in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the 
United States in the North Atlantic Treaty of Organization (NATO) (Bures 2006: Durward 2006).  
 
Advancing Regionalization. Promoting peacekeeping by ROs has diverse risks. For example, it provides an 
excuse for the UN or the international community not to get involved in a certain situation in which 
peacekeeping is necessary (Williams 2008). Consequently, even to maintain international peace and security, 
those at stake only get as the quality of peacekeeping that ROs’ lesser capacity can provide (Bures 2006: 
Williams 2008). Furthermore, regionalization of peacekeeping has a risk of undermining the international norm 
supported by the UN Charter and international law (Arthur 2010, 15: Williams 2008). This aspect is discussed 
specifically in the section 3-3.  
 
Uneven geographical presence and institutional differences. The most apparent disadvantage involving regional 
peacekeeping is the geographical coverage of ROs and also institutional differences among them. Firstly, there 
are some regions that do not have regional arrangements, such as East Asia. Second, even if the regional 
organizations are active in several regions, they sometimes do not have provisions for peacekeeping or conflict 
resolution mechanisms as the AU or the NATO have, such as in the Middle East. Accordingly, East Asia and 
the Middle East, where no capable ROs exist, have been suffering from long-lasting conflicts and cannot make 
any substantial efforts in conflict management or resolution at all (Bures 2006, 97). 
3－3 The Relationship between ROs and the UN 
The UN has performed dominant and significant roles in peace operations since its establishment. Accordingly, 
it is indispensable to discussing regional peacekeeping in light of the UN. This section specifically reviews the 
cooperation between the UN and ROs, as well as the discussion over the primacy of the UNSC in regard to the 
authorization of the use of force under the UN Charter.  
 
Cooperative peacekeeping. The cooperation between the UN and ROs in peacekeeping operations is becoming 
a recent trend. Scholars by and large advocate that cooperative peacekeeping, both institutional and 
─ 56 ─
Literature Review of Regional Peacekeeping
─ Towards a Reigning Custodian of Peace ─
56
 
6 
 
mission-based, are crucial to maintain regional and international peace and security as William (2008, 318) 
notes, ‘for the foreseeable future hybrid solutions are more likely to provide a realistic model for peacekeeping 
in Africa’. Nevertheless, the collaboration between them, to date, does not appear to be as effective as a 
majority of scholars expect.  
To begin, Yamashita (2012) offers a conceptual framework ‘subcontracting’ and ‘partnering’ to help to 
understand the increasing institutional partnership between the UN and ROs over the past decades. 
Subcontracting is a hierarchical cooperation between the UN and ROs. In this type of mission, although ROs 
play a primary role, they must be authorized by the UNSC. In contrast, partnering is a more horizontal 
cooperation between the two actors. For example, the AU prefers the latter rather than the former because the 
AU can mobilize logistical or financial resources that it often lacks under the mandated operations by the UNSC. 
The EU, however, expects that by partnering, their missions are followed by UN missions so that they can 
reduce the burden of peacekeeping operations. In this way, both regional organizations selectively utilize the 
institutional partnership. Thus, his argument is helpful to comprehending the future of peacekeeping, 
particularly from the UN’s perspective of how it can play a role in the field of regional peacekeeping. 
The mission-based collaboration of peacekeeping between the UN and ROs, including the hybrid peace 
operation in Darfur, in fact varies by institutional partnership, has increasingly become prominent as a 
contemporary peacekeeping avenue. Coleman (2011) points out that the dichotomy between regional and UN 
peacekeeping is not helpful to explain the contemporary peacekeeping in sub-Saharan Africa, claiming that the 
Sub-Saharan African states have disengaged from long-term autonomous regional peacekeeping and are 
increasingly preferring UN peacekeeping instead of peacekeeping by ROs like the ECOMOG interventions in 
Liberia and Sierra Leone in 1990s. In fact, even though independent peacekeeping such as the ECOWAS 
interventions and the AU missions in Burundi, Sudan and Somalia have been supported logistically or 
financially, or both, by outside actors. Hence, these operations have already had an ad hoc hybrid nature. 
Additionally, the missions in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Burundi were followed by UN peacekeeping operations 
subsequently and furthermore the mission in Darfur transformed into AU-UN hybrid peacekeeping for the first 
time in the peacekeeping history, where the AU operates daily missions while the UN primarily administers 
them. In spite of this stream, the collaborative peacekeeping has some challenges, as well as advantages.  
Some authors identify the positive aspects of shared peacekeeping between the UN and ROs over 
independent regional peacekeeping. Coleman (2011), for example, argues that the UN peacekeeping can offer 
financial resources, international acknowledgement and standing from contributing to peacekeeping and 
material support including military equipment and trained troops, of all which regional peacekeeping is usually 
deficient. Similarly, Tardy (2014) indicates the benefits of collaborative operations in light of burden sharing, 
strategy and flexibility. Firstly, burden sharing makes it possible for organizations to get access to financial, 
logistical, and human resources more easily and obtain information and legitimacy which they often need. In 
other words, no single actor can respond to every case, providing the essential resources in need. Secondly, this 
type of peacekeeping provides effective and coherent approaches to conflict. Strategically well-coordinated 
operations enable the operating actor to deal with conflict in response to the need of the parties in a conflict, 
ranging from peacekeeping to peacemaking and peacebuilding. Lastly, due to the above two positive aspects, 
hybrid operations have become flexible in offering multidimensional delopyments such as in Darfur.  
Opposed to this optimism, the cooperation also has challenges and risks. Tardy (2014) argues that one 
problem is balancing the institutionalization and flexibility. Hybridization has a nature of hierarchical and 
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asymmetrical relations between organizations, based on differing capacities and institutional weight as well as 
political interests. As a result, the institutionalization of the cooperative operations between organizations 
favours efficient responses to conflict at the expense of flexibility. Also, hierarchical and asymmetrical 
relationships lead to the problem of accountability and ownership (Tardy 2014: Weiss and Welz 2014). Because 
of different financial or logistical capacity among organizations, one organization may feel that they are not 
playing a responsible role in a mission. By the same token, political divergences and institutional differences 
can have a large impact on the peacekeeping mandates. Weiss and Welz (2014), for instance, argue that while 
ROs tend to take risk-assuming approach to casualties, the UN is likely to averse the risk of jeopardizing 
peacekeepers lives. They claim that AU missions are willing to take casualties 10-12 times higher than peace 
operations carried out by Western countries. Williams (2009) states that whereas the AU wanted the UN to take 
over its mission on the ground, the UN member countries were extremely unenthusiastic about that, considering 
the harsh situation in Somalia. Tardy warns that hybridization might be capitalized by the Western states by 
subcontracting peace operations to other parts of the world in order to decrease their own burden or avoid being 
in the front line. 
Regarding empirical cases, in the case of Mali the AU had little opportunity to reflect on its voice in the 
decision-making process in the UN peacekeeping deployment that took over the African mission (Weiss and 
Welz 2014). Mickler (2013) concludes by his single case analysis of the AU mission in Darfur (UNAMID) that 
UNAMID proved to be ineffective in protecting the citizenry in Darfur, securing the displaced and stopping the 
violence. The failure of the mission was not only due to the undeveloped nature of the AU and the disagreement 
among the AU countries about how to manage the crisis, but also to the compromise with the Sudanese 
government, which demanded that the mission had to maintain an African character and refused the 
independent UN peacekeeping. To make the matter worse, the warrant for the President Omar al-Bashir’s arrest 
by the International Criminal Court (ICC) complicated the situation. Supported by the UNSC, the indictment 
led to the tension between the partners in the hybrid operation. 
 
Primacy of the UNSC. Whether or not regional peacekeeping challenges the primacy of the UNSC is a central 
debate regarding regional peacekeeping. The use of force is the most contentious issue pertaining to robust 
peacekeeping by ROs in this context. De Wet (2014) and Zwanenburg (2006) argue that regional peacekeeping 
has not overturned the primacy of the UNSC. On the other hand, Paliwal (2010) disagrees over this view, 
claiming that the UNSC has confirmed that African ROs have a right to take first-instance action containing 
military actions and hence regional peacekeeping has the primacy over the UNSC. 
After the traumatic peacekeeping experience in Somalia in the early 1990s, the UN has distanced itself 
from the African continent. In the meantime, African governments have changed their policies towards the 
conflicts in Africa. This shift can be seen in the slogan, ‘African solutions to African problems’ (Williams 
2008). In fact, the Constitutive Act of the AU has a provision (article 4[h]) for intervention in a member state in 
the instance of war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity. The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) initially 
advocated in 2001 and endorsed at the World Summit in 2005 also accelerated the regional initiative. When 
sovereign states fail or are unwilling to fulfill the primary responsibility to protect their population, the R2P 
enables the international community to intervene in another country in the cases of genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing and crimes against humanity with the UNSC authorization4. As such, ‘beyond simply ad hoc or 
coincidental practice, the regional organizations increasingly view themselves as the bodies charged and 
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empowered with primary responsibility for maintaining peace, security, and stability in their regions’ (Paliwal 
2010, 188).  
In 1990, the ECOMOG intervened in Liberia without prior authorization by the UNSC. This was 
followed by the ECOMOG intervention in Sierra Leone in 1997 and NATO’s air strikes in Kosovo in 1999, 
which led to the animated debate over the primacy of the UNSC. Article 53(1) of the UN Chapter VIII 
stipulates that regional military action shall not be conducted without the authorization of the UNSC. The only 
conditions where military action are allowed are self-defense and the use of force under authorization of the 
UNSC, which are prescribed in Articles 2(4) and 42 of the UN Charter respectively. In other words, regional 
peacekeeping with enforcement action has to be authorized by the UNSC. By conducting the case studies in 
Africa, De Wet concludes that none of the peace operations in her analysis, that is Liberia, Sierra Leone, 
Guinea-Bissau, Cote d’Ivoire and DRC, overturned the provisions of the UN Charter, accordingly the primacy 
of the UNSC, because these enforcement actions were based on either the consent of all the parties to the 
conflict or the host government. This consent-based argument is also in line with the Zwanenburg’s claim that 
there is no unauthorized enforcement if the conflicting parties comply with the robust operations. Moreover, 
both assert that it is highly doubtful that the enforcement actions in the African cases obtained retrospective 
authorization from the UNSC because the relevant UN documents related to the enforcement peacekeeping 
were too ambiguous or gave no explicit expression to recognize post-facto authorization to the missions. If the 
AU abided by the UN rules, and there was no later authorization, they argue that the UNSC is still supreme. 
Paliwal (2010), on the contrary, considers that regional peacekeeping has primacy over the UNSC. 
According to his analysis of the AU missions in Darfur, Burundi, and Somalia, and of the ECOWAS missions 
in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau, Cote d’Ivoire and Guinea as well as the studies of relevant UN 
statements and resolutions, he and a sufficient number of other scholars supported the interpretation that 
enforcement peace operations by these organizations were frequently authorized retrospectively. Thus, the 
UNSC has confirmed that African ROs have a right to take first-instance action. Paliwal concludes that this RO 
supremacy over the UNSC might be the development essential for Africa to establish sustainable peace.   
Durward (2006) argues from a slightly different perspective to Paliwal, discussing why the report of the 
High Level Panel (HLP) in 2004 proposed mandatory authorization for all regional peacekeeping, recognizing 
the post-facto recognition, and why this proposal was not picked up in the Secretary-General’s report, In Lager 
Freedom in 2005. He insists that ECOWAS in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau, and NATO in Kosovo, 
obtained the post-facto authorization and thus encouraged each RO to act freely, endangering the primacy of the 
UNSC. However, Durward’s central argumentation is that although the primary purpose of the HLP was the 
attempt to strengthen the UNSC and deal with the exploitation as well as use of power by regional hegemons, 
this endeavor failed because of the uncooperative attitude from ROs. This is because the proposal would have 
restricted ROs’ freedom to act without outside interference such as from the UNSC.  
4 Critical Evaluations of the Findings  
The fourth section proceeds with a critical evaluation of the arguments and findings of the above articles. This 
is done by focusing on theoretical perspective, empirical foci, and methodology in order to clarify the scope of 
future research.  
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4－1 Dilemma of Legitimacy and Effectiveness 
Legitimacy is one of the advantageous aspects of regional peacekeeping, as Bures points out. It is reasonable to 
conclude that peacekeeping is unlikely to be successful without the consent of and cooperation with the warring 
parties. On the other hand, legitimacy does not necessarily bring about the other aspects of effectiveness stated 
in the introduction: the accomplishment of mandated tasks and a halt of violence in both the short and long-term. 
Surprisingly, few scholars have researched on this dilemma using both a theory and an empirical-based case 
study. For instance, though accepted by the Sudanese government, the hybrid Darfur mission failed to stop the 
violence in the country and secure safety for refugees. Acceptance does not necessarily leads to an effective 
mission. On the other hand, operations cannot be commenced without acceptance. Here there is a dilemma 
between legitimacy and effective operations, which future research can explore.  
4－2 Resolving the Primacy Problem of the UNSC 
There are somewhat contradicting views on whether or not regional peacekeeping challenges the primacy of the 
UNSC (De Wet 2014; Zwanenburg 2006; Paliwal 2010; Durward 2006). However, it is worth noting that hybrid 
peacekeeping can potentially overcome confusion over primacy because hybridization includes UN 
peacekeeping deployed through the decision of the UNSC. Neither the literature on collaborative regional 
peacekeeping or on its legal perspective has taken this into consideration. Hence, future research can bridge 
these two areas of research.  
4－3 Comparative Case Study with Coherent Criteria of Effectiveness   
First and foremost, policymakers and academics might want to know how to maximize the advantages of 
regional peacekeeping and minimize the disadvantages associated with it. The case studies carried out in the 
literature in this review (Arthur 2010: Hardt 2009: Weiss and Welz 2014: Williams 2008, 2009) observe lessons 
learned hence might be beneficial for similar missions in the near future. However, few researchers have 
conducted a thorough comparative case study crossing the cases of independent peacekeeping by ROs, the 
cooperative peacekeeping between ROs and the UN, and independent UN peacekeeping. This is despite the fact 
that a number of authors advocate cooperative or hybrid regional peacekeeping over independent peacekeeping 
by ROs or the UN (Coleman 2011: Mickler 2013: Weiss and Welz 2014: Williams 2008, 2009).     
Secondly, they assessed the effectiveness of peacekeeping from their own angle and did not take all four 
aspects of the effectiveness mentioned in the introduction into account. Notably, the case studies conducted by 
these authors tend to omit the long-term (durable peace) perspective. Together with the lack of comparative 
case studies, the research is not capable of fully persuading us that cooperative regional peacekeeping has 
comparative advantages over other types of missions and will be effective in the future.  
Furthermore, one may ask what the above literature means by cooperation. Yamashita’s two models of 
‘subcontracting’ and ’partnering’ (2012) enable us to distinguish the institutional and mission-based cooperation 
between the UN and ROs. Tardy points out the rationale and challenges in cooperative peacekeeping. However, 
their arguments do not help to answer to what extent the autonomy of ROs and the dependence on other 
organizations should be balanced. Also, while it seems that a transition from ROs and to the UN is present in a 
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empowered with primary responsibility for maintaining peace, security, and stability in their regions’ (Paliwal 
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this endeavor failed because of the uncooperative attitude from ROs. This is because the proposal would have 
restricted ROs’ freedom to act without outside interference such as from the UNSC.  
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The fourth section proceeds with a critical evaluation of the arguments and findings of the above articles. This 
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peacekeeping deployed through the decision of the UNSC. Neither the literature on collaborative regional 
peacekeeping or on its legal perspective has taken this into consideration. Hence, future research can bridge 
these two areas of research.  
4－3 Comparative Case Study with Coherent Criteria of Effectiveness   
First and foremost, policymakers and academics might want to know how to maximize the advantages of 
regional peacekeeping and minimize the disadvantages associated with it. The case studies carried out in the 
literature in this review (Arthur 2010: Hardt 2009: Weiss and Welz 2014: Williams 2008, 2009) observe lessons 
learned hence might be beneficial for similar missions in the near future. However, few researchers have 
conducted a thorough comparative case study crossing the cases of independent peacekeeping by ROs, the 
cooperative peacekeeping between ROs and the UN, and independent UN peacekeeping. This is despite the fact 
that a number of authors advocate cooperative or hybrid regional peacekeeping over independent peacekeeping 
by ROs or the UN (Coleman 2011: Mickler 2013: Weiss and Welz 2014: Williams 2008, 2009).     
Secondly, they assessed the effectiveness of peacekeeping from their own angle and did not take all four 
aspects of the effectiveness mentioned in the introduction into account. Notably, the case studies conducted by 
these authors tend to omit the long-term (durable peace) perspective. Together with the lack of comparative 
case studies, the research is not capable of fully persuading us that cooperative regional peacekeeping has 
comparative advantages over other types of missions and will be effective in the future.  
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majority of missions, no research has told us the best timing for that transition. Thus, a comparative study of the 
cooperative peacekeeping is not only useful to explore to what extent collaboration including hybrid operations 
should be strengthened and elaborated, but it is also crucial to answering when the transition to the UN part of 
the hybrid should be enacted.  
4－4 Narrow Empirical Foci 
The literature tends to discuss regional peace operations in the context of the African continent, which gives us 
fruitful perspectives on regional peacekeeping in the African context only (Arthur 2010: De Wet 2014: Mickler 
2013: Paliwal 2010: Weiss 2014: William 2008: William 2009: Zwanenburg 2006). This narrow focus appears 
because only Africa, as aside from Europe, has an institution enabling them to operate autonomous 
peacekeeping including robust military action. In contrast, there are some regions in the world that have no 
regional arrangements, meaning that countries are incapable of operating peacekeeping missions in areas such 
as in East Asia and the Middle East. Overall, as a consequence of the narrow empirical focus on Africa, it is 
difficult to argue that there is an overall advantage in the collaborative regional peacekeeping, including 
hybridization. In other words, it is difficult to generalize the theory. 
Nevertheless, the limited focus of the recent literature does not mean that regions mentioned above do not 
possess the potential to attain the comparative advantages that ROs have, such as commonalities, conflict 
resolution and legitimacy. Even if a certain region lacks capable institutions to conduct peace operations, these 
advantages should foster third parties’ ability to perform peacekeeping in the region with the help of countries 
which it belongs to. However, given that the distribution of regional peacekeeping is considerably skewed to 
Africa, one can only respond by analyzing other types or ad hoc nature of regional operations, such as the 
Australian-led peace mission in the Solomon Islands. This, however, is not the focus of this essay.  
4－5 Quantitative Study 
It is crucial to identify determinants of successful regional peacekeeping. Some of the articles in this review 
essay conducted a case study, and also many looked at UN documents leading to legal-type argument, but none 
of them have done a quantitative study. Contrary to qualitative studies, a large-N study helps to identify which 
factors (e.g. commonalities, proximity, legitimacy, financial resources, institutional capacity, neutrality, 
regional hegemons, independent peacekeeping by ROs or the UN, or the cooperative peacekeeping between 
them) are actually determinants of effective regional peacekeeping. It is explicit that if causal theories are 
supported by both qualitative and quantitative studies, arguments are robust and persuasive. 
5 Conclusion: The Future of Regional Peacekeeping 
This review essay sheds light on the effectiveness and challenges of regional actors as a new type of peace 
custodian. In summary, in spite of the significant and strengthened function of regional peacekeeping, 
encompassing collaboration between the UN and ROs, regional peacekeeping does not seem to be a panacea for 
maintaining regional as well as international peace and security, as the cases of Somalia or Sudan suggest. Also, 
the legal discussion in regard to the use of force by ROs is highly controversial. Disappointing outcomes and 
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the contentious legal debate are not only associated with fundamental problems of RO capacity and 
coordination problems between ROs and the UN, but also the UN’s willingness to be committed to 
peacekeeping.  
Notwithstanding, a majority of scholars advocate in theory the usefulness of the collaborative regional 
peacekeeping, maintaining that cooperation between the UN and ROs ought to be enhanced further. However, 
none of the articles in this essay have succeeded in demonstrating that collaborative peacekeeping is indeed the 
best option. In order to make latent positive aspects, or theoretical advantages of regional peacekeeping to be 
manifest, this review essay, accordingly, elucidated several gaps and suggested future research by critically 
reviewing the recent literature on regional peacekeeping. First, there is a puzzle relating to legitimacy and the 
substantial effects of peacekeeping that none of the literature has explored in depth. However, resolving this 
dilemma is essential for future successful missions. Secondly, collaborative regional peacekeeping offers the 
possibility to overcome legal concerns regarding the use of force by ROs challenging the supremacy of the 
UNSC. Furthermore, the essay proposed a comparative case study ranging from independent peacekeeping by 
ROs to the collaborative peacekeeping and UN peacekeeping, framed through coherent criteria of effectiveness 
in evaluating different types of peace operations. Finally, the essay pointed out that in conjunction with the 
comparative study, a quantitative study would also be fruitful for identifying crucial factors for successful 
regional peacekeeping.  
Again, proponents of a new-fashion custodian of peace do not seem to have sufficiently shown why 
regional peacekeeping is so promising. It might be true that regional peacekeeping is preferable, but preference 
is not a synonym for effectiveness. Also, it may be too premature to conclude that the new-style peace 
operations are advantageous. By elucidating gaps and problems in recent articles on regional peacekeeping, this 
essay, therefore, is conducive to fill in the chasm between the optimistic expectation of regional peacekeeping 
and the current reality of regional operations full of obstacles and challenges, helping both practitioners and 
researchers explore how to transform weaker regional actors into reigning custodians of peace.  
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hybridization. In other words, it is difficult to generalize the theory. 
Nevertheless, the limited focus of the recent literature does not mean that regions mentioned above do not 
possess the potential to attain the comparative advantages that ROs have, such as commonalities, conflict 
resolution and legitimacy. Even if a certain region lacks capable institutions to conduct peace operations, these 
advantages should foster third parties’ ability to perform peacekeeping in the region with the help of countries 
which it belongs to. However, given that the distribution of regional peacekeeping is considerably skewed to 
Africa, one can only respond by analyzing other types or ad hoc nature of regional operations, such as the 
Australian-led peace mission in the Solomon Islands. This, however, is not the focus of this essay.  
4－5 Quantitative Study 
It is crucial to identify determinants of successful regional peacekeeping. Some of the articles in this review 
essay conducted a case study, and also many looked at UN documents leading to legal-type argument, but none 
of them have done a quantitative study. Contrary to qualitative studies, a large-N study helps to identify which 
factors (e.g. commonalities, proximity, legitimacy, financial resources, institutional capacity, neutrality, 
regional hegemons, independent peacekeeping by ROs or the UN, or the cooperative peacekeeping between 
them) are actually determinants of effective regional peacekeeping. It is explicit that if causal theories are 
supported by both qualitative and quantitative studies, arguments are robust and persuasive. 
5 Conclusion: The Future of Regional Peacekeeping 
This review essay sheds light on the effectiveness and challenges of regional actors as a new type of peace 
custodian. In summary, in spite of the significant and strengthened function of regional peacekeeping, 
encompassing collaboration between the UN and ROs, regional peacekeeping does not seem to be a panacea for 
maintaining regional as well as international peace and security, as the cases of Somalia or Sudan suggest. Also, 
the legal discussion in regard to the use of force by ROs is highly controversial. Disappointing outcomes and 
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the contentious legal debate are not only associated with fundamental problems of RO capacity and 
coordination problems between ROs and the UN, but also the UN’s willingness to be committed to 
peacekeeping.  
Notwithstanding, a majority of scholars advocate in theory the usefulness of the collaborative regional 
peacekeeping, maintaining that cooperation between the UN and ROs ought to be enhanced further. However, 
none of the articles in this essay have succeeded in demonstrating that collaborative peacekeeping is indeed the 
best option. In order to make latent positive aspects, or theoretical advantages of regional peacekeeping to be 
manifest, this review essay, accordingly, elucidated several gaps and suggested future research by critically 
reviewing the recent literature on regional peacekeeping. First, there is a puzzle relating to legitimacy and the 
substantial effects of peacekeeping that none of the literature has explored in depth. However, resolving this 
dilemma is essential for future successful missions. Secondly, collaborative regional peacekeeping offers the 
possibility to overcome legal concerns regarding the use of force by ROs challenging the supremacy of the 
UNSC. Furthermore, the essay proposed a comparative case study ranging from independent peacekeeping by 
ROs to the collaborative peacekeeping and UN peacekeeping, framed through coherent criteria of effectiveness 
in evaluating different types of peace operations. Finally, the essay pointed out that in conjunction with the 
comparative study, a quantitative study would also be fruitful for identifying crucial factors for successful 
regional peacekeeping.  
Again, proponents of a new-fashion custodian of peace do not seem to have sufficiently shown why 
regional peacekeeping is so promising. It might be true that regional peacekeeping is preferable, but preference 
is not a synonym for effectiveness. Also, it may be too premature to conclude that the new-style peace 
operations are advantageous. By elucidating gaps and problems in recent articles on regional peacekeeping, this 
essay, therefore, is conducive to fill in the chasm between the optimistic expectation of regional peacekeeping 
and the current reality of regional operations full of obstacles and challenges, helping both practitioners and 
researchers explore how to transform weaker regional actors into reigning custodians of peace.  
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